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ABSTRACT This article addresses the so-called institutional deficit in poststructuralist
discourse theory by articulating a recent development of such a theory, the so-called dis-
cursive policy analysis as mainly elaborated by David Howarth and Jason Glynos, with neo-
Poulantzian state theory, especially as re-worked by Bob Jessop. It then employs the resulting
framework for analysing the internal socio-political logic of the European integration process,
and asks why this process has not been challenged by any robust counter-hegemonic
alternative despite the regressive consequences that its neo-liberal design has triggered. The
argument developed in the article is that the increasing support of European social democ-
racy, once Euro-critical, to the European project played a crucial role in this development.
Nevertheless, such a thesis raises the following research question: how the forces leading the
European integration process were able to gain and maintain the active support of European
social democracy to that process despite the lack of opportunities for social democratic
policies at the EU level? To address this question, the article engages with the main policy
proposals developed by the European social democratic parties between the mid-1980s and
early 2000s, paying special attention to the impacts of these proposals on EU’s institutional
architecture. The textual analysis of both the social democratic and EU policy discourses
reveals that the widespread appeal of a narrative structured around the “empty signifier” of
“competitiveness” served to integrate the social democratic identity within the neo-liberal
integration project, organizing a range of discursive logics that successfully marginalized
critical worries about European integration. Nevertheless, the article ends by hypothesizing
that the technocratic mode of European integration that this historical development has
instituted, constitutes the main condition of possibility for the current emergence of Euro-
sceptic populist forces throughout the EU, so that in the medium term the neo-liberal-
oriented European construction might lead to the destablization of the very foundations of the
European order.
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Introduction
Most scholarly work on European studies treats theEuropean integration process as a directionless process,which seeks EU expansion as an end in itself. Never-
theless, since the late 1980s, the European integration process has
constituted a motor of neo-liberalization of European society
(Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013). Despite the regressive conse-
quences of this process in terms of increasing economic
inequality, loss of social rights and decreasing democratic
legitimacy, the European project had not been challenged by
any robust counter-hegemonic alternative until the recent
outbreak of right-wing populism throughout the EU. The
argument presented in this article is that the increasing support
of European social democracy, once Euro-critical, to the
integration project has played a crucial role in this historical
development. Social democratic Europeanism has been an
essential link in the EU hegemonic chain, since it has enabled
the integration of large segments of the popular classes into its
neo-liberalizing discourse. In the same manner, that the “Key-
nesian compromise” (Duménil and Lévy, 2011) reached between
labour and capital was essential for the stability of post-war socio-
economic order, the neutralisation of the effects of the neo-liberal
breaking up of that settlement was an even more important task
for ensuring EU neo-liberal-oriented construction.
In fact, during the post-war decades the social content of the
European integration process was not neo-liberal at all. The
“Monnet mode of integration” sought to foster a form of
Europolity functional to Western European Keynesian models of
development (Jessop, 2007: 211). The notion of “embedded
liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982) captured well the kind of liberalization
promoted during that period, in which market logics were
politically controlled by state regulations. Accordingly, at that
stage, the integration process sought the establishment of a
supranational mode of economic cooperation, limiting the
liberalizing tendencies to trade and leaving “enough space for
governments to pursue social democratic policies” (McGowan,
2001: 75).
Nevertheless, during the seventies, this “first project of
European integration” (Ryner, 2007) entered into crisis, in
conjunction with the crisis of the Fordist mode of accumulation
at the national level. The crisis of the 1970s provoked divergent
responses in the different member states, and consequently,
serious intergovernmental frictions at the EU level. But it also
generated key stimuli for relaunching the integration process
(Moravcsik, 1991). It was thus in the aftermath of this crisis that
the “second project of European integration” (Ryner, 2007) was
born. With it, during the eighties, the socio-economic content
of the integration process progressively took a different
direction and eventually neo-liberalism came to determine its
subsequent steps.
However, it was precisely during this second period that
previous Euro-critical social democrat parties became enthusiastic
supporters of the integration process. Before the eighties, most
social democratic parties outside the founding member states
were Eurosceptic (Dimitrakopoulos, 2011: 2). For instance, in the
early seventies, the social democratic Prime Minister of Sweden
Olof Palme criticized the European Community (EC) for its “four
Cs”: capitalism, clericalism, conservatism and colonialism (Moss,
2005: 6). In the six founding states, social democratic parties were
more pro-European integration, although usually maintaining a
faltering Europeanism, lacking any type of consistent project for
Europe and always leaving the leadership in this issue to their
main rivals, the Christian Democrats (Camia, 2012). However,
this situation changed in the course of the eighties, when all
previously Eurosceptic social democratic parties (the parties
from Sweden, the United Kingdom, Greece, Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Ireland) carried out an Europeanist turn
(Featherstone, 1988: 3; Holmes and Lightfoot, 2007), while the
social democrats of the Six ostensibly increased their Europeanist
profiles (Sassoon, 1996; Pierson, 2001). As Bailey (2009: 3) points
out, given that the neo-liberalising effects of the European project
made social democratic policies less likely to be implemented
across the member states, this “social democratic turn to
Europe”1 seems to constitute a puzzle: why and how were the
actors leading the European integration process able to gain and
maintain the active support of European social democracy to that
process despite the lack of opportunities for social democratic
policies at the EU level?
Existing explanations of this puzzle can be broadly divided into
two groups. A first group stresses the importance of institutional
factors, emphasizing how the increasing relevance of European
institutions stimulated social democrats to shift their attitude
towards the EU (see, for example, Ladrech, 1997, 2000; Douglas,
2002; Diamond, 2012; Escalona et al., 2013). Alternatively,
a second field of literature remarks the importance of the role
of ideas in the shaping of social democrat rationalities, situating
the “turn to Europe” in the context of the deep erosion of core
traditional social democratic principles during the late twentieth
century (see, for example, McNamara, 1998; Worth, 2007). For
this second set of accounts, socialist parties dropped their
opposition to the EU because they sidelined any conception of
wealth redistribution and state interventionism, thus engaging in
instead of challenging neo-liberalism.
Although these explanations are important in describing the
pro-EU social democratic move, both types of interpretations
leave important issues unresolved. Firstly, both obliterate the
agential responses to the contextual changes they describe,
naturalizing in a teleological way the Europeanist move. In this
sense, it remains unclear why socialist forces opted to answer
these contextual changes in the manner they did, rather than, for
instance, attempting to reverse them (Bailey, 2009: 14). Secondly,
these explanations take the institutional and/or ideational
environments as being formed outside the realm of politics,
thoroughly constraining social democratic forces, but never being
constrained by them. Nevertheless, nor the redefinition of the
boundaries of political economy away from the Keynesian
emphasis on redistribution, nor the emergence of Europe as a
political space of reference were apolitical phenomena. And
finally, these accounts are unable to explain why social
democratic forces remained loyal to the EU once it appeared to
systemically curtail progressive policies.
To overcome these deficits, this article deploys a theoretical
framework based on the articulation of post-structuralist or
discursive policy analysis (Howarth and Griggs, 2012; Glynos
et al., 2015) with neo-Poulantzian state theory (Poulantzas, 2000
[1978]). According to the former, public policies constitute
radically contingent discursive articulations whose signification is
the outcome of multiple struggles carried out by different actors
tussling to overdetermine them (Foa Torres, 2015: 376). This
Laclaudian perspective is hence very helpful in explaining the
processes of constitution and dissolution of political identities
that underpin public policies. However, because poststructuralist
policy analysis lacks a strong theorization of state power and
infrastructural conditions, we turn to Poulantzas’ sociology of the
modern state, especially as reworked by Jessop (2007), to better
grasp the functions of the state in relation to the political
economy of capitalism.
This article is structured as follows: the second section outlines
the basic arguments of the above-mentioned two strands of the
theory and establishes a dialogue between them based on the
centrality of the Gramscian concept of hegemony. The following
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three sections reconstruct the institutional dynamics that under-
pinned the development of the European project in relation to the
different integration strategies followed by the two central
discourses competing within the European political arena.
Finally, the last section summarizes the analytical productivity
of the discursive approach used in the article by raising some
conclusions about the state of the European integration project
starkly different from those most commonly found in mainstream
integration theory. A main assumption developed throughout the
article contends that, despite the fact that Europeanization was
obviously not the only factor pushing towards the neo-
liberalisation of social democratic identity, since such a neo-
liberalisation was a global phenomenon that in several EU
countries pre-dated the neo-liberal re-launch of European
integration, the EU, nonetheless, “took the lead in enjoining its
members to conform to a new world where Keynesianism was
anachronistic and welfare states and industrial relations needed
serious reforms” (Ross, in Moschonas, 2009b: 11).
Theoretical framework
Discursive policy analysis. Firmly rooted in Laclau and Mouffe’s
(1985) post-structuralist discourse theory, and taking their lead
from the so-called “argumentative turn” (Fischer and Forester,
1993) in public policy studies, post-structuralist policy analysis’
most fundamental ontological assumptions are condensed in the
theoretical games born of the coupling between two provocative
Laclauian aphorisms: the one stating “the rhetorical foundations
of society” (Laclau, 2014) and the other affirming “the impossi-
bility of society” (Laclau, 1990). To begin with the first, post-
structuralists contend that the foundations of social reality are in
a crucial sense rhetorical: all objects and subjects are discursively
constructed by signifying practices to the extent they only acquire
meaning when they are articulated within relational systems of
signifying rules. Discursive articulation, understood “as any
practice establishing a relation among elements such that their
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau
and Mouffe 185: 105), therefore acquires ontological primacy: an
independent material world outside the discursive does exist, but
the elements of this world do not have meaningful identity
automatically or by themselves, but only when they are con-
tingently placed in concrete semantic systems.
In this sense, in contrast to interest-based approaches to policy
analysis, a discursive perspective understands that not only
agents’ interests are discursively constructed via articulatory
practices, but also that the agents themselves are political
products whose identities are dependent upon their relation to
other identities (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 55). Identities appear
therefore as “points of temporary attachment to the subject
positions which discursive practices construct for us […] they are
the result of a successful articulation or ‘chaining’ of the subject
into the flow of the discourse” (Hall, 1996: 6).
In fact, a concrete discourse is defined as hegemonic when it
effects the joining of the subjects in its structure of meaning,
showing in consequence its schema of interpretation of the world
as a commonsensical universal truth. In this manner, the
practices of institution of hegemonic discourses, to the extent
that delimit which political identities are possible in each social
order, also crystallize power relations by drawing lines of
inclusion and exclusion. In this sense, the definition of what is
included in the hegemonic formation and thus what comes to
shape the “common worldview” constitutes not only a purely
political question but also a fiction: the common worldview—
which prefigures the “general interest”—is always the expression
of a specific identity that gets to present its particular vision as the
most logical for most of the social actors. For this reason, the
weaving of a hegemonic discourse always consists in “practices of
coalition building” (Howarth, 2013: 199), that is, practices
whereby a particular actor links different demands and identities
into a single political project capable of presenting its discourse as
representing the interests of the whole society.
Nevertheless, given that every hegemonic articulation is only a
partial fixation of the social world, there is always some meaning
that escapes the complete structuring intended by the hegemonic
discourse: in fact, “it is a logical impossibility that a particular
identity, constituted through difference, can fully represent all
identities” (Koechlin, 2013: 96). This constitutes hence the second
basic axiomatic premise of the post-structuralist discourse theory,
that is, the idea that any system of rules is marked by a radical
impossibility, where impossibility refers to the inherent incom-
pleteness and precariousness that uncovers its unnecessary
character. As Derrida (1967) pointed out, any structure of
meaning fails to institute a complete fixation of the field of
discursivity since there is always an irreducible possibility of the
drifting of meaning. In less ontological terms, once instituted, a
hegemonic discourse has no guarantee of its maintenance over
time: in fact, its reproduction depends on its capacity to prevent
subjects from translating dislocatory experiences into challenges
to its predominance. Therefore, in second place, hegemony
consists also in practices of governance (Howarth, 2013: 202),
that is, ruling practices that incorporate and accommodate, in an
institutional way, some of the demands of the ruled sectors, while
dispersing and marginalizing others.
Nevertheless, although any hegemonic discourse always has to
face the impossibility to construct an ultimate closure that fixes
ad eternum the meaning of all identities, a minimal degree of
fixation is necessary within every system of meaning, since
otherwise we would have something which amounts to a state of
“social psychosis” (Marchart, 2014: 277). Two conceptual
elements carry out this function according to poststructuralist
discourse theory. Firstly, what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) called
“nodal points”, that is, those privileged signifiers that stabilize the
meanings of a discursive system by partially unifying such a
system: these are those words “to which ‘things’ themselves refer
to recognize themselves in their unity” (Žižek, 1989: 96).
Secondly, despite the institution of nodal points, the impossibility
of universal ground persists. But at the same time, its need does
not disappear. “Empty signifiers come to conceptualize such an
impossible but necessary task. They are the symbolic means of
representing the absent fullness “through the presence of its
absence” (Laclau, 1996: 53). For example, “In a situation of
radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it
becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of this absence” (ibid:
44). This is the essence of an empty signifier: a signifier that,
either because an underdetermination or an overdetermination of
signifieds that prevents it from having a fixed signified, becomes
detached from any concrete meaning to embody the very
incompleteness of society (Wullweber, 2015: 81). These symbols,
however, do not emerge arbitrarily, but come into existence
because actors succeed in emptying certain signifiers of any
reminder of particularity, so that such signifiers can become
points of identification for multiple different identities. At the
same time, however, this implies that empty signifiers constitute
empty places where different actors compete in their efforts to
represent a specific sense of universality, that is, to fill them by
promising the achievement of the absent fullness.
Accordingly, discursive policy analysis develops a kind of
policy analysis that focuses on the discursive practices that seek to
mobilize and articulate shared meanings around certain issues—
instead of others—to fix the discursive fields that institute and
sustain institutional orders. It is an approach therefore that
emphasizes the centrality of certain terms in giving identity to a
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policy field and develops the possibility of studying the political
strategies through which these terms are developed in policy
paradigms.
Interlude: The institutional deficit in post-structuralist dis-
course theory. Because of its stress on the contingency of any
social reality because of the ontological primacy of the discursive,
critics of poststructuralist discourse theory have frequently argued
that this perspective suffers from a kind of institutional or
sociological deficit, in the sense that it is unable to account for the
complex relationships between structural (socio-economic, insti-
tutional) arrangements and concrete practices (Geras, 1990;
Lewis, 2005). In Mouzelis’ (1988: 11) words, “because their
excessive fear of reifying institutional structures, [Laclau and
Mouffe] go to other extremes and analyse practice in an insti-
tutional vacuum”. Consequently, poststructuralist discourse the-
ory is accused of lacking the tools for apprehending “the
materiality and structurality of the social” (Chouliaraki, 2002: 94),
ending in an underestimation of the “conditions of reception of
discourse in favour of the discursive mechanisms of its produc-
tion” (Jessop, 1990: 298). For instance, many Marxists have cri-
ticized post-structuralist discourse theory’s incapacity to
conceptualize how the contradictions arising from the capitalist
accumulation process dislocate existing hegemonic regimes (Rey
Araújo, 2015), while others have signalled how in Laclau’s work
the “institutional system” is deployed as an anonymous black box
that allows eschewing the necessary fine-grained analysis of the
array of forces operating within institutions (Boucher, 2008;
Anderson, 2016: 82).
Nevertheless, at the ontological level, post-structuralist dis-
course theory has never defended the idea that social relations are
in a state of continual flux, since it has precisely coined concepts
like “nodal points” or “sedimentation” for referring to the
temporary structuring of social relations. Likewise, this theory has
never conceptualized discursive practises as occurring in contexts
freed from structural constraints. In fact, to the extent that post-
structuralist discourse theory, as its name indicates, draws its
basic ontology from post-structuralism, it remains attached to the
de-centring of the subject characteristic of it, so that it avoids any
kind of agency-centred model of social explanation. For
poststructuralist discourse theory, in fact, the only space for the
autonomy of the subject is the space left free by the dislocation of
the structure (Laclau, 1990: 60).
In this sense, contrary to what is sustained by some of its
voracious critics, the so-called institutional deficit of post-
structuralist discourse theory does not arise from inherent
deficiencies in its ontology, like for instance a putative semiotic
monism (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 133) or subjective ahistoricism,
but from areas of analytical neglect, a fact which calls for further
developments of its theoretical potential. In fact, Glynos, Griggs
and Howarth’s efforts during the last decade for articulating an
approach to policy analysis on the basis of poststructuralist
discourse theory’s ontological commitments can be read as an
attempt to work on this deficit, and thus to overcome the
traditional self-limitation of discourse theorists, long ago noted by
Torfing (2005), of focusing on “soft” topics of social science
research, such as ethnic identities or political ideologies, leaving
“hard” topics like institutional analysis, political economy or
public administration to mainstream neo-positivist approaches.
Nevertheless, as Howarth himself admits, in post-structuralist
styles of theorising “structures are still deemed to be too abstract
or general, whilst their radical contingency and fluidity renders
them unhelpfully indeterminate in critically explaining particular
regimes and practices in specific historical conjunctures” (2013:
208; Hansen, 2008). It is for this reason that this paper articulates
poststructuralist policy analysis with the conceptual apparatus
provided by neo-Poulantzian state theory.
Neo-Poulantzian approach to state power. The starting point of
Poulantzas’ conceptualization of the state neatly connects to the
last insight we raised from the poststructuralist understanding of
public policies, namely that policies constitute products “shaped
by the overall balance of political forces in society” (Griggs and
Howarth, 2013: 22). Thus, in a very similar manner that also
echoes the Gramscian notion of integral state (Buci-Glucksmann,
1980), Poulantzas (2000[1978]) understood the state as a social
relation that condenses in a concrete institutional ensemble the
balance of forces existing in a given society as well as the various
contradictions underlying it. Hence, in a neo-Poulantzian
perspective, public policies and institutions constitute crystal-
lizations of historical processes, for which their functioning
reflects the interests of victorious political actors in past social
conflicts, or alternatively, the institutionalised compromises
reached between the different contending agents. In this sense,
according to this perspective, the state does not constitute an
autonomous neutral window as in some forms of pluralism, nor a
mere tool in the hands of some other agent as in some versions of
Marxism, but an asymmetrical “terrain of struggle” (García
Linera, 2015) embodied with certain “strategic selectivities”
(Jessop, 1990) that predispose it to reproduce certain logics over
others or to provide advantages to some groups in pursuing their
objectives while imposing constraints on others. Furthermore,
these structural selectivities are understood as having strategic
meaning for social struggles, so that they modulate the strategies
of the agents that try to influence the state, becoming state
institutions constitutive of actor’s identities. Given the discursive
ontology exposed above, here we can understand these strategic
selectivities as the outcome of the “sedimentation” (Torfing, 1999:
69) of concrete discourses that institutionalize specific policy
narratives.
Neo-Poulantzian state theory understands the state as a
“distinct ensemble of institutions whose socially accepted
function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions
on a given population in the name of their ‘general will’ ” (Jessop,
2007: 9), following the metonymical logic of hegemony explained
above according to which any universality is always a particular
political orientation capable of gaining a general consensus. At
this point, the distinctive contribution of post-structuralist
discourse theory to state theory probably resides in thinking of
institutions as not only hegemonic sedimentations, and so as
radically political, but also as constitutively barred or contingent
(Foa Torres, 2015: 362). Policies appear therefore as signifying
systems aimed towards the temporary suspension of the radical
contingency which haunts any social formation: the concern is
not only on the instances of discursive institution of any policy
regime, but also on the ways through which such regime excludes
alternative possibilities.
Understanding the state as a social relation enables a vision of
how its power is dependent on social relations outside itself. In
this sense, for any state project to become hegemonic it must be
linked to a feasible accumulation strategy capable of securing the
social reproduction of the economic order. The concept of
“accumulation strategy” hence refers to those economic aspects of
any hegemonic discourse, that is, those state strategies intended to
solve the problems of capital reproduction (Jessop, 1990: 159). An
accumulation strategy is hegemonic when it can sustain the
institutionalised correlation of forces represented in the corre-
lated state project, producing in this way a “general economic
interest” able to delimit within certain parameters the interests,
strategies and spatial-temporal horizons of the different social
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forces as well as to ensure the social cohesion of the whole
(Jessop, 2002). In this sense, changes in the correlation of forces
and/or accumulation strategies might lead to spatial reorganiza-
tions of state’s strategic selectivities (Poulantzas, 1974). When
analysing the dynamic of EU integration, this implies under-
standing this process as a process that constructs a new
institutional form of European governance coupled with a
specific socio-economic content (Van Apeldoorn, 2002).
In sum, the theoretical framework articulated in this article
directs its analytical focus on the production of policy discourses
as a strategic-discursive moment of the production and
reproduction of hegemonic regimes. Hence, it is a kind of policy
analysis that always implies political analysis, that is, analysis of
the correlation of forces within a society as well as of the dynamic
contradictions underpinning such a correlation.
European social democracy’s role in the establishment of the
Single European Market
As exposed in the introduction, European social democrats
started to identify in an explicit way with the Europeanist
discourse during the 1980s, when the integration process was
being relaunched through the single market initiative. To a large
extent, such a revitalization of the integration project was made
possible by the deep socio-economic dislocations that European
countries were facing during the 1970s, which involved, among
other elements, stagflation, chronic declining growth levels, fiscal
crises, decreasing rates of productivity or intensified international
competition. Nevertheless, as it arises from the theoretical
framework discussed above, the nature of a crisis is not simply
given by its dislocations or effects. Instead, some actors impose on
others their diagnosis of “what has gone wrong” and thus “what is
to be done” (Blyth, 2002: 10). Therefore, in periods of crisis, it is
imperative to attend to the policy discourses that key actors
develop.
Among the multiple interpretations struggling to hegemonise
the reading of the thorny conjecture of the 1970s, a shared
consensus progressively emerged that the crisis responses would
have to imply, in one way or another, a deepening of the
European integration project. For the social democratic forces,
the narrative that came to formalise such an intuition was the
Delorist project, opposed, as we will see in the following sub-
section, by a neo-liberal discourse. Nevertheless, the Delorist
discourse, understood as the first comprehensive approach to the
integration project articulated by European social democracy, was
in turn the product of the failure of a previous and alternative
social democratic exit to the crisis of the 1970s, markedly more
national in character: the Mitterrand project for a democratic
socialism. Therefore, to understand the former, we need to grasp
what the latter—and especially its defeat—implied for the
European left.
The Mitterrand experience. The socialist François Mitterrand
was elected president of France in June 1981 relying on the
“Common Programme of the Left” (supported by the French
communists) that called for a “rupture with capitalism” and a
reformist transition towards a democratic socialism. Nevertheless,
his left-wing government was faced from the beginning with the
contradiction of maintaining the French commitments with the
EC, a clear capitalist project, or pursuing a program of socialist
transformation in France. The Partie Socialiste (PS) exposed in its
ideological manifesto of 1980 its confidence in this double aim:
The realization in France of a socialist project will be a
shock within our European environment, which will cause
it to be less marked by liberalism and Atlanticism. Engaged
in the construction of a socialist society, France will
contribute to the democratization of the Community, she
will utilize the institutions to favour the convergence of the
social struggles against unemployment, for the reduction of
the working time, for the control of multinational
companies, for the defence of liberties and for the extension
of democracy (PS, 1980).
After Mitterrand’s victory, the French government started a
vigorous Keynesian strategy of reflation of the economy coupled
with a huge reformist project involving, among other elements,
nationalisations, industrial relations legislation that implied
worker control, welfare expansion, diminishing of weekly work-
ing hours, industrial planning and a large increase in subsidies
granted to public enterprises (Kesselman, 1984). In Moss’s (2005:
131) words, “it was once the most radical and credible alternative
to neo-liberalism in Europe”, and because of that, threatened the
future of the EC.
Nevertheless, Mitterrand’s intentions to pursue a reflationary
strategy within the EC started to run into serious difficulties by
1982: the domestic economy failed to respond in the desired
manner, high US interest rates squeezed financial markets and
other EC countries failed to take complementary action2. In
relation to this latter point, the pressures arising from the
commitments involved in staying in the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM)—the fixed exchange rate monetary regime
introduced in 1979 by the European Economic Community
that, in the image of the Deutschmark block, was aimed at the
maintenance of low levels of inflation (Hancké, 2013)—played a
crucial role in halting the expansionary programme of
Mitterrand. In the ERM’s fixed exchange rate system, unlike
what happened in the previous Bretton Woods’ fixed but
adjustable exchange rate system, the costs of price inflation
could not be adjusted through devaluation, but impacted directly
on the balance of payments. This led the French government’s
counter-cyclical economic policy to cause a tremendous trade
imbalance that ruined the franc and triggered a harsh budgetary
crisis (Clift, 2005). By March 1983, the only alternative
available for the Socialist-Communist government to follow the
programme of socialist transformation was a deepening in the
reflationary strategy through a substantial devaluation of the
franc (coupled by an important revaluation of the mark)
accompanied by the implementation of protectionist trading
measures, the lowering of interest rates and a purposeful
nationalization of industry3. However, this strategy implied
their exit from the ERM, since both the devaluation of the
franc permitted within the ERM as well as the revaluation
of the mark accepted by the Germans were a long distance from
what France needed to neutralize the accumulated inflation
differentials. The other option was remaining within the
ERM, turning towards contractionary fiscal and monetary
policy measures that would reduce the rate of inflation and
implementing only a small devaluation.
The U-turn of 1983 marked the shift towards the second
option, implementing a set of austerity measures coupled with a
new hyper positive stance vis-à-vis European integration. In 1984,
Mitterrand declared that France’s new “national goals” were
“modernization” and “global competitiveness” (quoted in Kuisel,
1987: 30). The new “economic rigueur” framework implied not
only a shift of priorities in macro-economic policy, but it also
constituted the springboard for an assault on the French dirigiste
model of capitalism, with reforms de-indexing wages from prices,
“restructuring” the steel, automobile and shipbuilding sectors,
deregulating the financial market or implementing an initial
change in the Welfare State away from universalistic solidarity
and towards the Anglo-Saxon scheme (Ross, 1987: 211–213).
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Mitterrand’s experiment had collided with the limits of the
strategic selectivities inscribed in the political economy of the EC,
in which the cycle “strong currency-increasing unemployment-
low interest rates-low costs” was favoured by the institutional
framework. This macroeconomic framework favoured the inter-
ests of the supply-based Northern economies, led by Germany,
which were (and still are) inflation-averse to the extent that their
growth came from exports. Thus, in 1983, under the danger of
bankruptcy, Mitterrand, although obviously aware that an
important cause of the French inflation was the mark’s under-
valuation, came to accept that “leaving the monetary system was
impossible” (Mitterrand, in Cameron, 1996: 70). The implicit
assumptions behind this decision were that a long-run austerity
approach to fiscal and monetary policy was required to bring
about a strong price and wage deflation as the means to increase
national competitiveness and stimulate investment, and espe-
cially, that this was the only feasible strategy towards boosting
growth. Within the ERM, the traditional enlarged popular
coalition around the working class constructed by social
democratic parties (Moschonas, 2002), because of their constitu-
tive reliance on strategies pursuing full employment and
protection against market commodification tendencies, was no
longer a viable hegemonic articulation. Indeed, we can read this
process from the second face of the concept of hegemony
theorised above, according to which politics consist of weaving a
terrain of struggle biased towards the constitution of discursive
coalitions favourable to one’s own interests. In this sense,
replacing the 1981 program of “social democracy in one country”
by another ordoliberal in character perhaps was not the only
available option for Mitterrand4, but it did constitute the most
“appropriate” decision (Olsen, 2008) in the web of inter-
subjective practices in which European actors were embodied.
As many observers have noted (Featherstone, 1988: 129;
Haywood, 1993: 274), in the 1983 turnabout Mitterrand picked
up the European project as a substitute collective horizon of
future for rationalizing his neo-liberal turn while retaining a
degree of socialist credibility. In the aftermath of the dislocation
of the statist discourse, in which the identities and interests of the
French actors were deeply contested, Mitterrand opted for
presenting the European project as the new platform for
defending French national interests, Europeanizing consequently
the identity of the socialist party (Risse et al., 1999: 170).
Importantly, such a correlation between a transition towards a
“new” social democracy and a turn towards a Europeanist stance
was a common trend of all European social democratic parties in
the 1980s (Bailey, 2009: 107). In this sense, the joint manifesto of
social democratic parties for the 1984 European elections mirrored
this shift and represented a qualitative step towards a more pro-EC
stance with respect to the 1979 minimalist manifesto (Lodge, 1984:
41). Thus the manifesto of the Confederation of Socialist Parties of
the European Community (CSPEC) assumed European integration
as a central instrument for the realization of the social democratic
goals of social justice, job creation, solidarity and freedom (CSPEC,
1984). Nevertheless, the manifesto emphasized the need for
coordinated efforts rather than integrated common policies, an
approach that reflected the British and Danish reluctances to
further supranationalisation (Lodge, 1984: 41). In contrast, in the
French case, Mitterrand’s Europeanism was deeper and implied the
assumption that “the future of France goes via the renewal of
Europe” (in Featherstone, 1988: 129). From that moment, the
advance of the European project would be presented not only as
equivalent to the advance of France but also to the defence of the
French collectivist tradition:
The future of French exceptionalism, the future of the
social achievements which we have attained, passes
through Europe […] Understand that this Europe is a
necessity today for the forces of progress, for the values
which represent the Republic (Mitterrand 1986, in Risse
et al., 1999: 171).
Two opposite discourses on the Single European Market. It was
in this context that European social democratic parties changed
their attitude from “ambiguity to promotion” (Holmes and
Lightfoot, 2002) with regards European integration. As Escalona
and Vieira (2014: 23) explain, European social democracy saw in
Mitterrand’s U-turn both the defeat of the “last chance” of
national Keynesianism as well as the right response to such a
defeat that sought to renovate the social democratic model at the
European level. Mitterrand, in alliance with Helmut Kohl, became
from that moment onwards one of the leading figures in the
development of the new stage of the integration process, the so-
called Single European Market.
Mitterrand’s pro-integration discourse was mainly articulated
by his former Minister of Finance and from 1984 to 1995
President of the European Commission Jacques Delors. For
Delors, the revitalization of the integration process constituted
the only feasible opportunity for European societies for, in the
face of the challenges entailed by the “globalization of markets
and new technologies”, recapturing control of the economy to
defend the “European model of society” and thus “to master our
destiny” (Delors, 1988). At the same time, however, Delors
(1985b) was not reluctant to emphasize the need for substantial
changes to adapt to the growing international competition. In this
sense, according to Delors the first step towards the revitalization
of the integration process was the completion of the internal
market, that is, the abolishment of all internal barriers to
the free movement of goods, services and investment within
the EC. Nevertheless, the Delorist approach to the completion of
the single market envisaged the elimination of “internal frontier
controls in their entirety” (Commission of the European
Communities (CEC), 1985: 9) to be complemented, in the
short term, by (1) the institution of a single currency,
(2) the development of some kind of social union and (3) the
establishment of mechanisms of supranational governance
(especially in the field of industrial relations) (Delors, 1989a). It
was therefore a “balanced” (Ziltener, 2000) approach to the single
market, in line with a conception of the European integration
process as being guided by the formula “competition that
stimulates; co-operation that reinforces; and solidarity which
unites” (Delors, 2013: 174):
The European Community will be characterized by co-
operation as well as competition. It will encourage
individual initiative as well as solidarity. […] A large
market of 320 million will increase competition. It will
benefit the consumer, and allow European industry to
compete on a world scale. It will create new job
opportunities and contribute to a better standard of living.
These benefits will only be fully achieved with increased co-
operation (Delors, 1988).
As reflected by the 1985 White Paper on Completing the
Internal Market, cornerstone of the Delorist project, Delors’
intention was to use cooperation regards market integration to
build a momentum toward more European expansion:
The free movement of goods is an important, valuable and
possibly indispensable step which has to be taken before
economic integration can be achieved. But it is not the
ultimate goal. […] Just as the Customs Union had to
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precede Economic Integration, so Economic Integration
has to precede European Unity (CEC, 1985: 55)
The nodal point that came to provide to the social democratic
forces with a point of attachment to the Delorist discourse was
that of the European Social Model (ESM), which drew inspiration
from the 1973 Social Action Programme’s idea of a “Social
Europe”. The basic idea behind the notion of an ESM was the
existence of a European model of capitalism, different from
Anglo-Saxon pure-market capitalism, capable of simultaneously
promoting sustainable economic growth and social cohesion
(Jepsen and Serrano, 2005). European integration had therefore
to protect such a social model against the potentially destructive
tendencies of globalization. In a detailed economic survey
presented in 1992, Delors came to defend this vision and showed
how regulated integration could maintain Europe’s international
competitiveness whilst ensuring proper working conditions and
wage levels (Delors, 1992). In the Delorist discourse,
the creation of a large market must go hand in hand with
the organization of a European social area. The beneficial
effects of a large market would be dissipated if some
Member States were to seek a competitive advantage by
sacrificing social achievements (Delors, 1985a: 30).
But in opposition to the Delorist discourse, which was
progressively being endorsed by the different European social
democratic parties, a neo-liberal approach to the single market
was articulated by the right-wing governments of the EC, the
more export-orientated fractions of capital and global financial
institutions (Van Apeldoorn, 2002). The master signifier which
came to structure this interpretation of the crisis was that of
“Eurosclerosis”, coined at the beginning of the 1980s by the
president of the Hayekian Mont Pèlerin Society Herbert Giersch
(1985). According to Giersch, the stagflation of European
economies was a consequence of the “institutional rigidities”
provoked by government over-regulation, trade union abuses and
excessively generous social benefits draining resources from the
private sector (ibid.). The result was decreasing levels of
competitiveness of the European economies. The institution of
a common market was therefore imagined as the removal of trade
barriers to intensify competition between member states and
market forces and thus accelerate technological innovation,
eventually improving the international competitive position of
the EC. As expressed by Thatcher (1988) in her speech to the
College of Europe:
The aim of a Europe open to enterprise is the moving force
behind the creation of the Single European Market. By
getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies
to operate on a European scale, we can best compete with
the United States, Japan and other new economic powers
emerging in Asia and elsewhere.
Therefore, in contrast to the Delorist balanced approach, the
ordoliberal “systems competition” (Ziltener, 2000: 180) was based
on a narrow interpretation of the single market, purely aimed at
the reduction of political intervention in the market sphere by
enabling European capitals to exploit differences among national
regulations. As expressed again by Thatcher (1988):
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the
state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European
level with a European super-state exercising a new
dominance from Brussels. [...] Our aim should not be
more and more detailed regulation from the centre: it
should be to deregulate and to remove the constraints on
trade [...] we in Britain would fight attempts to introduce
collectivism and corporatism at the European level.
The institution of competitiveness as master policy paradigm.
The strategic goals and compromises established in the Single
European Act (SEA) of 1987 were mainly shaped by the neo-
liberal discourse, so that the national economies were forced into
the treadmill of unfettered competition. As Grahl and Teague
(1989) explained, the key mechanism that ensured the elimina-
tion of all national barriers was the institution, following the
proposal of the 1985 White Paper, of the method of mutual
recognition—instead of harmonization—as the preferential
mechanism for building the single market: according to this
principle, in those areas without specific European-wide regula-
tion member states had to accept without restriction products
fabricated in the other member states. Such a policy change
represented a crucial break in the mode of market governance
within the EC, and, coupled with the qualified-majority voting
system in the European Council that made the drafting of EU-
wide harmonization policies incredibly difficult, generated
important downward pressures on national regulatory standards,
since goods commercialized according to lower standards could
be sold just as easily as higher-standard ones. Nevertheless, the
SEA allowed member states to maintain stricter legislation
without mutual recognition in especially sensitive areas (Schmidt,
2007). In any case, in most policy areas, the combination of free
movement, no internal frontiers and mutual recognition led to
intense exposure of national product markets to competition. As
implied in the Cecchini Report (CEC, 1988: 6), it was expected
that the single market would intensify competition not only in the
economic field but also in the regulatory field between states.
As we can therefore observe, the empty signifier that came to
structure the dominant policy discourse on the single market was
that of “competitiveness”. In fact, many scholars have argued that
it is precisely the placing of the logic of competition as the guiding
principle to reform and inform both the state and the society the
element that better indexes a shift towards a neo-liberal discourse
(Cerny, 1997; Jessop, 2002; Foucault, 2008). Thus, while the
embedded liberalism of the post-War era assumed the need to
insulate certain areas of social life from market competitive logic
while at the same time promoting competition in other areas,
neo-liberalism defines competition as the general principal of
societal coordination, a move that implies the extension of market
logics throughout the social body. Competition and the inequality
it brings are valued positively within the neo-liberal discourse
because they are seen as boosting an entrepreneurial ethos
through which innovative knowledge is best pursued. As
expressed by Hayek (2002[1968]: 19):
the necessary changes in habits will occur only when those
who are ready and able to experiment with new procedures
can make it necessary for the others to imitate them, with
the former thereby showing the way; but if the majority is
in a position to prevent the few from conducting
experiments, the necessary discovery procedure will be
frustrated. The fact that competition not only shows how
things can be improved, but also forces all those whose
income depends on the market to imitate the improve-
ments, is of course one of the major reasons for the
disinclination to compete.
The work of Schumpeter, the first theorist of entrepreneurial
competition, was crucial for the development of this specific
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neo-liberal approach to competition (Davies, 2014). Schumpeter
(1934) had theorzsed entrepreneurial competitiveness as the
outcome of individual and collective engagement in permanent
innovation in the face of competition. Especially important, he
understood that the success of such a search for innovation was
dependent on a wide range of extra-economic factors rather than
solely on economic costs, as traditionally assumed by neo-
mercantilism. Analogous to the two traditional strategies of
business competition, costs leadership and product differentia-
tion, countries can compete on costs but also on other elements
that are not related to price (Fagerberg, 1988).
In this sense, and this constitutes a capital difference between
neo-liberalism and classical laissez-faire liberalism, competitive-
ness is seen by neo-liberals as a quality that does not emerge in
isolation within markets, but that needs to be actively cultivated
between the market, society and individuals. This theoretical
move thus expanded the arena of competitiveness to include a
wide range of cultural, technological, sociological, and especially
important here, institutional factors. Regarding the links between
the latter and competition, the work of another Schumpeterian
economist, Michael Porter, was very influential in European
policy-making circles. In The Competitive Advantage of Nations
(1990), Porter wrote that while it is firms which compete in the
market, it is state policies which cultivate market conditions to
enable them to exploit each economy’s competitive advantage.
Thus, under the new Schumpeterian understanding of competi-
tiveness, it became accepted that institutions set the framework
for the competitive advantages of firms and individuals, so that
the competitiveness discourse came to identify more and more
policy areas as sources of competitive advantages or disadvan-
tages. In the last instance, the point became no longer to defend
markets as competitive arenas, but to project societies-as-a-whole
as large competitive arenas (Davies, 2014). As phrased by
President Clinton, each nation is “like a big corporation
competing in the global marketplace” (quoted in Krugman,
1994: 29). The paradox was that this process did not lead to a
simple “roll-back” of state interventions, but to an actual “roll-
out” of them to enforce the institution of competitive logics (Peck,
2010). In Thatcher’s (1988) words, what was needed was “action
to free markets, action to widen choice”.
However, to make this possible, international competitiveness
had to have been previously problematized as a central policy
concern for European political actors. This is precisely what we
observe from the early 1980s and especially during the single
market debate, when globalization was increasingly constructed as
an unavoidable constraint that made inefficient any type of state
intervention at the national level (Hay and Rosamond, 2002), and
when the decreasing competitiveness of Europe vis-à-vis Japan and
the United States was established as a permanent threat to Europe’s
leading economic role (see, for example, Delors, 1989a: 5; Delors,
1989b: 116). For instance, the manifesto of the Party of European
Socialists (PES) for the 1994 European elections affirmed the need
to “face the economic challenge from both America and Asia
ensuring the European model of social democracy”5. In this
manner, the imagination of an indomitable process of globalization
was intimately linked with the perception of the need to manage
competition at the EU level, as seen for example in the joint
declaration of the leaders of the CSPEC in 1990:
The ever-increasing internationalization of the economy and
interdependence of our societies at every level means that it is
increasingly difficult to respond on a national level to the new
challenges which arise. Democratic control of the future
remains possible, provided that those elements of sovereignty
which can no longer be exercised in a purely national
framework are pooled (quoted in Ladrech, 1993: 207)
But once competitiveness is instituted as the key object of
governance, it also becomes a “mode of meta-governance”
(Jessop, 2015): how to link a wide range of factors to the
demands of economic competition becomes the guiding aim of
state activities, so that there is a shift in governmental priorities.
This is the reason why the competitiveness discourse raises major
questions about the sustainability of welfare states. As many have
pointed out, important trade-offs exist between the requirements
imposed by the aim of achieving higher levels of competitiveness
and the deployment of the range of social services associated with
the welfare state: for instance, while the development of the
welfare state increases the retribution of labour power, it also
hampers comparative advantages associated with low labour
costs; or while the institution of social rights protect citizens from
adverse conditions, it also limits the flexibility with which agents
respond to market changes (Alonso, 2007: 559–560). At a more
general level, while rising competitiveness implies assuming the
need to ensure the full adaptation of a society to market
exigencies, defending social protection involves the establishment
of mechanisms that tame market competitive logic.
Consequently, to the extent that the competitiveness discourse
prevailed in the design of the single market, the social policy
content of the SEA was minimal. It represented in fact a “by-
product” rather than a realization of the social dimension that
had been imagined by the Delorist discourse (Ziltener, 2000: 159).
Thus, although some “flanking social policy measures” (Bieler,
2007: 114) were included in the SEA, particularly regarding the
regulation of occupational health and safety policies, the creation
of regional policy funds or the institution of social dialogue
between management and labour at the European level, such
measures did not represent any significant advance towards the
construction of the social dimension. Delors did not disagree with
this evaluation and defined the social content of the SEA as
“purely symbolic” (quoted in Ziltener, 2000: 163).
Nonetheless, as explained in the Venturini Report, the single
market was seen as a positive step by the Delorist discourse to the
extent that it was thought of as promoting economic and social
convergence within the EC and thus enabling a future transition
towards a monetary, social and political union (Venturini, 1988:
26). In our view, if the integration-cum-competitiveness discourse
incarnated in the SEA succeeded in holding as credible such a
future horizon, it was not thanks to a simple elite operation of
depiction and manipulation, nor to any kind of social democratic
betrayal, but thanks to the capacity of the competitiveness
discourse to draw a collective imaginary that successfully
interpellated not only neo-liberals but also social democrats, thus
coming to represent the general interest. In this sense, the social
democratic turn to Europe was not favoured only from the more
defensive form of hegemony, the one that consists of reproducing
the status quo by disarming the challengers to its maintenance,
but also from its more offensive face, the one that implies active
persuasion of competing forces and the building of new collective
identities.
In this aspect, at least three elements played an important role.
In first place, some supranationalising reforms were included in
the single market programme, ranging from the legally binding
treaty form of the SEA (instead of a mere intergovernmental
agreement), to the increased powers given to the European
Parliament6 or the inclusion in the SEA’s preamble of the need to
develop a monetary union, all of them fiercely opposed by the
more Thatcherite actors. Secondly, the wave of electoral defeats
that most of social democratic parties suffered during the 1980s
provoked an important dislocation of the social democratic
identity and a subsequent search for new discourses (Wilks-Heeg,
1996). And last but not least, the Europeanization-cum-
competitiveness discourse was highly attractive for being the
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.60
8 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17060 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.60 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
final selection of such a search for at least two reasons. Firstly,
because as exposed above, during the 1980s the European social
democrats progressively took as self-evident the existence of a
relentless globalization process that could not be tamed at the
national level. In second place, because the interpretation of what
“to be competitive” meant was not a straightforward question.
Competitiveness constitutes one of those “floating signifiers”
(Laclau, 2005: 95) widely used in the political debate without
being defined in a clear way. It is an ambiguous and elusive
concept that can be invested with very different meanings, while
paradoxically, at the same time, it seems rather obvious and
intuitive, with a seemingly universal meaning freed from any
necessary qualification. In this sense, thanks to such a productive
fuzziness, because of this polyvalent but instinctive meaning, each
actor can see in it what he needs to see, so that it becomes a very
useful rhetorical resource for articulating different visions of
values while retaining some appearance of overall coherence.
Hence, what does competitiveness actually mean—who does
compete? How and through which mechanisms? How is
competitiveness related to other economic and social logics?—is
not a self-evident question, but a matter of intensive discursive
struggle.
And nevertheless, at the same time, competitiveness contains
an implicit or minimal normative content useful for grounding
political practices from a neo-liberal point of view. When we
think of competitions, we think of situations where participants
are free to compete and have some vaguely equal opportunity to
win. Furthermore, we assume unequal benefits for the different
participants at the end of the competition. If we speak about
countries, and given that one can only compete with competitors,
it is in the external sector where a country finds its competitors,
so that a country’s competitiveness entails necessarily its external
competitiveness. In this manner, to demand international
competitiveness is to demand that nations prove themselves
relative to one other.
In this sense, the competitiveness discourse, despite being
constitutively amorphous, entailed a terrain of struggle biased
towards economism and neo-liberal policies. When trade unions
and labour parties accepted that the welfare of a country is largely
determined by its success in world markets (Krugman, 1994: 30),
they also came to internalize the view that institutions constitute
mechanisms for seeking competitive efficiencies instead of places
of political struggle. Nevertheless, as the following section
explains, the new routes opened by such a hegemonisation of
the EU policy-making field by the competitiveness discourse were
not, admittedly, entirely neo-liberal: they contained both new
possibilities as well as important threats to the development of a
social democratic approach to Europeanization. How social
democrats addressed these potentialities is another issue.
The development of the EMU
Two different models of monetary integration. In 1990, 3 years
before the year of completion of the Single European Market, the
first stage of the European and Monetary Union (EMU), which
consisted in the abolition of exchange controls, was launched by
the European Council. Although the basic reform envisaged by
the EMU, namely the institution of a common European cur-
rency by 1999, was defended by both the Delorist and the neo-
liberal discourses on the base that it would reduce uncertainty
and encourage stability, these discourses nevertheless raised dif-
ferent visions on how this reform should be institutionally
developed.
For the Delorist discourse, monetary integration constituted
“the trigger for political union” (Degryse et al., 2013: 9): the
economic convergence that the common currency would bring
about would help EU member states to grow into a more
politically integrated region, thereby relegating potential political
frictions between them and producing common interests (Delors,
1992). The institution of the monetary union was going to be
implemented on the basis of formal selection criteria, so that the
pursuing of these criteria would foster convergence of economic
structures (Delors, 1989b: 13). In turn, European macro-
economic, tax and social policies were expected to develop
gradually, since they were understood as necessary supports for
economic integration (PES, 1996). For Delors (1989a: 82), “a
substantial development of the budgetary function of the EC in
the case of monetary integration” was necessary to correct
regional imbalances.
In contrast, the neo-liberal discourse assumed that it was not
feasible to build a social and fiscal union out of the heterogeneity
of national interests. Thus, by drawing from the German
ordoliberal tradition, which understands that market equilibrium
depends upon the existence of a legal framework that strips out
political discretion from the policy-making process to constrain
both economic policies and market functioning under concrete
pre-fixed rules, it turned need into a virtue and defended a model
of “monetary union without political union” (Degryse et al., 2013:
10). According to this model, monetary policy should be
managed by an independent central bank at the European level,
while social and economic policies should remain within the
competence of national governments (James, 2016). Nevertheless,
some kind of fiscal policy coordination at the European level—in
the form of binding rules on budgetary policy—was seen as
indispensable to ensure price stability, the chief aim of the EMU
for this paradigm. The reason was, in the words of Alexander
Lamfalussy, president of the European Monetary Institute, the
need ”to avoid tensions arising from excessive differences
between public sector borrowing requirements of individual
member countries” (Lamfalussy, 1989: 93). Or in other words,
ordoliberals demanded strict supranational fiscal rules—consist-
ing of limits to public deficits—because they feared that in a
monetary union perverse incentives for individual states towards
excessive debt financing would emerge, since interest rate
convergence provoked by monetary integration would enable
cheap credit in the poorer states. The ordoliberal discourse
therefore entailed a form of procedural governance at the
European level, that is, governance by formal rules and indicators
devised by experts, or in other words, “with only extremely
limited margin for political interpretation” (Degryse et al.,
2013: 10).
In contrast, European social democrats did not expect
economic convergence, and hence successful monetary integra-
tion, to be developed spontaneously through market stimuli, but
understood both processes as dependent on political debate and
discretionary decisions. For European socialist leaders, the EMU
was a “strategic objective”, but was “inconceivable without strong
political institutions to guide it” (PES, 1995). Thus, the leaders of
the CSPEC declared in 1990 that monetary integration needed to
be complemented by democratic mechanisms of control,
instruments allowing for anticyclical fiscal policies and provisions
against tax dumping (CSPEC, 1990). Furthermore, they rejected
fixed limits for national debts although accepting the necessity of
some guidelines for guaranteeing monetary stability (ibid.).
A regime of competitive austerity. EMU’s institutional set-up as
implemented by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) constituted a
compromise between the neo-liberal and social democratic dis-
courses, even though it clearly contained an important ordoliberal
bias that took tangible form on the basis of three pillars. Firstly, in
the field of macro-economic policy-making, the EU role was
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.60 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17060 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.60 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 9
limited to monitoring national budgetary policies and loosely
“coordinating” national macro-economic policies. Secondly, the
Europeanised monetary regime was left in the hands of the
European Central Bank (ECB), a central bank with a particularly
strong degree of independence to the extent that, unlike the Fed
or the Bank of England, it enjoys full independence with respect
to instruments and targets within a strict mandate for price sta-
bility (at the expense of other goals such as growth or full
employment). And thirdly, articles 121 and 126 of the treaty and
the subsequent 1997 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) established
a fiscal surveillance regime that placed stringent constraints on
budget deficits and public debt and hence left little room for
discretionary demand management at the national level. Fur-
thermore, to verify compliance with the rules, quasi-automatic
mechanisms of European intervention were instituted, consisting
of a monitoring procedure for preventing excessive deficits
(known as the “preventive arm” of the SGP) and a corrective
procedure for redressing them (the “corrective arm” of the SGP).
Nevertheless, such a rule-based framework was attenuated by
the fact that the application of the corrective arm of the SGP
required a discretionary decision in the ECOFIN (the Council of
Ministers in its composition of economic and finance ministers)
with a qualified majority vote in favour, a political obstacle
therefore to the implementation of automatic sanctions7 . In fact,
before the 2008 financial crisis, even 44 times (out of 177 possible
occasions) the deficit or debt ceilings were breached with relative
impunity (Calmfors Wren-Lewis, 2011), leaving in consequence
SGP’s bounding capacities with little credibility.
In any case, the separation of fiscal policy from monetary
policy implied that the monetary and budgetary tools available
before to manage economic problems at the national level were
gone without previously development at the supranational level.
Essentially, less competitive countries lost the single mechanism
that allowed them to periodically eliminate trade deficits, restore
competitiveness and ease budgetary pressures, namely currency
devaluation. Thus, without the capacity to adjust the exchange
rates, without any kind of European coordinating mechanism
(such as an EU treasury) between state fiscal policies and
in a context of free capital mobility and no customs barriers,
the remaining macro-economic tools used by modern govern-
ments, tax and spending policies, also became seriously
constrained by, in the first case, the tax competition that emerged
between states in the struggle for attracting mobile assets (Oates,
2001), and in the second, the fiscal discipline required by
monetary integration itself.
Consequently, domestic cost reductions as an instrument for
correcting competitiveness imbalances became privileged in the
strategic selectivities of the new EU architecture. This fact was
problematic not only because it was against the Schumpeterian
discourse on competitiveness that the European Commission had
promoted (and that defended, as explained above, not less public
investment but a different one), but also because the correlation
between lower wages and increased competitiveness is rejected by
several economists (see, e.g., the classical study of Kaldor (1978)).
Despite these facts, strategic voices within the neo-liberal
discursive coalition, like for instance BussinessEurope, the biggest
confederation of European employers’ organizations, overtly
defended that the main determinant of the evolution of
competitive advantages resides in wages. As expressed by its
president, George Jacobs, in the 2003 Macroeconomic Dialogue
with Social Partners:
Europe must accelerate its effort at home to improve its
competitiveness. It is therefore important to improve the
labour market’s ability to react, allowing wages to reflect
productivity differences, promoting mobility and
improving incentives to take a job. Furthermore, let me
emphasize that the Commission should also propose
measures promoting entrepreneurship (Jacobs, 2003)
In this sense, the ordoliberal paradigm on European integra-
tion propelled a pathway towards monetary integration that
assumed as inevitable the painful nature of this process. It was in
fact a regime of “competitive austerity” (Albo, 1994: 147), that is,
a system in which each country reduces its domestic labour costs,
and thus its internal demand, and thus its economic growth8 .
Not surprisingly therefore, this discourse saw as productive the
exclusion of politics from the pressures arising from democratic
economic policy-making. Economic convergence was expected to
occur as a consequence of the market pressures arising from
monetary integration itself and in this sense it can be qualified as
a market-driven model of monetary integration. Given these sets
of elements, it would not have been surprising if Europe’s social
democrats had taken a negative stance towards the EMU.
Nevertheless, they supported the project once again. How then
were the social democratic aspirations articulated within the pro-
integration discourse?
The post-Maastricht scenario: searching for a new European
social democratic strategy
The re-articulation of the ESM. As many scholars have observed
(Lightfoot and Wilde, 1996: 10; Bieler, 2007: 114), European
social democracy supported the EMU process with a “yes, but”.
Although the Maastricht treaty did not include any significant
step towards the building of a social or fiscal union, since in the
social policy field the only outcome was a modest Social Protocol,
Kohl, Mitterrand and Delors agreed that these unions would be
developed at some point in the near future (Marsh, 2011: 154).
Therefore, once again, social democrats assumed that while most
of their demands were not feasible in 1992, the integration in the
monetary domain would foster functional spill-overs towards the
rest of policy areas. For the European socialist parties, the
Maastricht Treaty therefore constituted “a step in the right
direction” (PES, 1994).
In fact, the political scenario that was opened in the late 1990s
seemed to provide the long- awaited window of opportunity for
developing these social democratic aspirations. By the end of the
twentieth century, the predominance of social democrats in
European national governments was remarkable, since they were
not only governing in twelve out of fifteen EU states, but also in
the largest ones (United Kingdom, Italy, France and Germany)
and in the richest ones (Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and
Netherlands). Such a correlation of forces had never existed
before, so that it represented an ideal opportunity for changing
the neo-liberal course of European integration.
The common social democratic strategy for reforming the
monetary union was settled by the so-called Larsson Report in
1993. This report aimed at developing a renewed social
democratic approach to the integration project by articulating
in a “two-pillar strategy” both the traditional social democratic
demand of more expansionary macroeconomic policies at the
European level as well as new proposals on gender equality, active
labour market policies and welfare state reform (PES, 1993). The
inclusion of these last points constituted a remarkable shift, since
it meant the assumption by European social democracy of some
of the neo-liberal critiques to the welfare state:
We will establish [...] a new productive balance between
security and change [...] Therefore we will [...] reform
welfare policy so that it gives good incentives for work
and employment. Social protection, taxation and
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unemployment insurance have to be made coherent to
open doors to job opportunities and ways out of poverty
(PES, 1993: 8).
Such an approach, which later was defined as a “social
investment perspective”, rested on the idea that social policy
provisions should constitute investments aimed towards enhan-
cing labour skills and human capital rather than just means of
providing social protection. In the words of some of its main
theorists, it was a perspective that, although largely in agreement
with the Keynesian assumption that a strong economy requires a
strong state, advocated for an “active welfare state” that
had to be capable of ensuring the sustainability of public finances
while “upholding a different, knowledge-based, economy”
(Vandenbroucke et al., 2011: 6). In policy terms, the option was
to use social policy for improving the labour supply rather than
for simply repairing damage caused by market failures.
At the European level, this implied a shift from “Eurokeyne-
sianism” (Aust, 2004), understood as an attempt to rebuild
welfare institutions at the European level, towards an “innova-
tion-driven economic policy” (Escalona and Vieira, 2014: 32) that
perceived European integration as an instrument to raise
European competitiveness. The social democratic approach to
European integration of the 1980s, based on the building of an
ESM as a maginot line of resistance to globalization pressures,
was sidelined during the nineties by this new approach highly
influenced by Third Way philosophy. Thus, although the “new
social democratic” discourse incorporated straightforward cri-
tiques to neo-liberalism, especially regarding the latter’s approach
to unemployment uniquely based on the reduction of labour
costs, it clearly also articulated pivotal elements of neo-liberal
thinking, particularly regarding its critique to the passive welfare
state and its lauding of competition.
The overall approach of the Larsson Report was also displayed
by the 1993 Delors’ White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and
Employment (European Commission, 1993). This White Paper,
which consolidated competitiveness as the empty signifier of EU
discourse, settled as the two central objectives of the EU economic
policy “helping European firms to adapt to the new globalized
competitive situation”, and “exploiting the competitive advantage
associated with the gradual shift to a knowledge-based economy”
(ibid: 62). To achieve these aims, the Commission established a
“policy of global competitiveness” based on (1) a “macroeco-
nomic framework which instead of constraining market forces
[…] supports them”, (2) reforms “aimed at increasing the
competitiveness of European industry and removing the rigidities
which are curbing its dynamism” and (3) “active policies and
structural changes in the labour market” (ibid: 62–67).
As we can observe, the enthusiasm with which social
democrats endorsed this new approach to social policy is
explained, to a large extent, because they saw in it an integral
element of the new form taken by European capitalism during the
1990s, which they defined as a “knowledge-based economy”
(KBE). Once the Fordist mode of accumulation had run out of
steam, social democrats envisaged a “new high-tech Fordism”
capable of restoring economic growth and creating the conditions
for social inclusion policies (Escalona and Vieira, 2014: 30). As
explained by Portuguese socialist Maria João Rodrigues (popu-
larly known as “the mother of the Lisbon Strategy”), the new
knowledge economy constituted “a strategy for international
competitiveness and social cohesion”:
With globalization, nations are competing to attract
investment, which, on one hand, depends increasingly on
the general conditions supporting business competitive-
ness. On the other hand, business competitiveness depends
increasingly on the capacity to answer just in time to the
specific needs of the customer. This involves managing a
greater amount of knowledge with the intensive use of
information technologies. Knowledge is becoming the main
source of wealth of nations (João Rodrigues, 2002: 2)
Given that a KBE was presumed to be featured by continuous
knowledge exploration, mutual learning between organizations
and path-breaking innovations, its labour market structures
needed to be more porous so as to permit continuous adaptation
and insertion of new ideas from the outside. In this manner, the
promotion of the social investment perspective on social policy
was accompanied by the deployment of the KBE as the dominant
economic imaginary and key focus of competitive strategies. In
the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, the PES completely endorsed this
new discourse, linking, via investment in knowledge and skills,
the creation of employment to increases in competitiveness:
Investing in knowledge should be a priority objective. The
unemployed should have effective possibilities in their
search for work by updating their skills, taking temporary
employment and developing activities in the local
community.
Employment is the priority and competitiveness the
instrument. This must be the basis for the defence of and
innovation in the welfare state
Productivity of businesses has to be improved, their costs
contained and their activities orientated towards fields
which offer comparative advantages. The operation of the
competitive markets must be stimulated, technological
innovation must be promoted, equitable salary agreements
must be guaranteed and competitively factors must be
promoted (PES, 1995)
However, as stated above, the European socialist strategy under
the EMU also emphasized the need to rectify the ordoliberal
architecture of the EU. For the PES (1995), “The implementation
of Monetary Union should be accompanied by increased co-
ordination of economic, budgetary, fiscal, employment and social
policies”. In this front, the social democratic discourse was again
mainly articulated by the Prime Minister of the French
government, in that moment Lionel Jospin, although now in
alliance with the German Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine. In
line with the Delorist model of monetary integration, the socialist
parties defended a rewriting of the Stability Pact—re-naming it as
“Jobs and Growth Pact”—based on the modification of three core
elements of the EMU: the prevalence of sound money policies, the
independence of the ECB and the absence of fiscal policy
coordination (Howarth, 2002: 357). They also argued for an
extension of state activism to the European level through the
institution of an economic government (Lafontaine and Strauss-
Kahn, 1999), whereby the European Council would provide broad
orientations for economic policy.
Governing the EU. Some advances in the building of the social
dimension achieved during the late 1990s and early 2000s seemed
to give credibility to the new social democratic strategy. What has
been called the “social moment” (1995–2005) (Pochet and
Degryse, 2013) of the integration process enjoyed its highpoints
in the adoption of the European Employment Strategy (EES) in
1997, by which employment policy became a “matter of common
concern”9 for the EU, in the development of the so-called
Cologne Process (1999), through which procedures for a
European macroeconomic dialogue between European public
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authorities and the social partners were put in place, and in the
launching of the Open Method of Coordination within the Lisbon
Strategy (2000). These measures, together with others like the
extension of cohesion funds, the adoption of the Charter for
Fundamental Social Rights (2001) or the approval of the 1998–
2000 Social Action Programme seemed to be initial steps towards
the construction of the largely awaited social dimension of
the EU.
Nevertheless, these set of achievements were not only “modest”
and “limited” (Manow et al., 2004: 30), given that any transfer of
competences in the social policy field was consciously avoided,
but also significantly distinct to those envisaged by the social
democratic discourse 15 years before. For instance, the EES,
accorded in the first Inter-governmental Conference with a
majority of social democratic leaders in 1997, reflected the new
social democratic discourse on “employability” and thus posited
as the primary aim the promotion of labour market flexibility
(European Commission, 1997). Its four official pillars were
employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportu-
nity (ibid.). Through them, the EES attempted to pursue the
traditional social democratic aim of full employment, but not by
relying on Keynesian macroeconomic instruments but on the
development of a competitive, knowledge-based economy. The
ambition was to articulate the aim of full employment with the
acceptance of supply-side economic policies as the best govern-
mental instruments in the era of globalization.
The new catchword “flexicurity” (coined by the social
democratic Prime Minister of Denmark Poul Nyrup Rasmussen
(Jørgensen, 2000)) came to synthetically condense this paradigm,
being a key nodal point in the re-articulation of the EU’s social
discourse under the hegemony of competitiveness imaginary (see,
for example, European Council, 2006). The notion of flexicurity
sought to combine in a “magic triangle” a flexible labour market
with few restrictions on employers’ hiring and firing of workers, a
highly developed activation system that facilitates re-entering the
labour market and a generous unemployment insurance scheme
(Martín, 2008: 14). Unemployment was therefore linked to a lack
of adequate skills to fill the new KBE, so that social policies
should invest in training and support labour market fluidity
(European Commission, 2007: 3).
Hence, in the context of increasing global competition, social
democrats perceived in flexicurity the way to preserve the ESM
while improving competitiveness (see, for example, Rasmussen
and Delors, 2007). Nevertheless, this strategy, given that fostered
recommodifying pressures on labour power instead of decom-
modifying ones, implied an important shift in the social
democratic identity. Such a discursive transition is better
understood if we take into account that, as explained above, the
social democratic point of attachment, the ESM, to the
integrationist discourse since the mid-1980s represented
a clear subaltern “subject position” within such a discursive field
because of the strategic selectivities of the EU’s hegemonic
articulation. In this manner, it was not surprising that, in the
absence of great dislocations, the flow of meaning of the ESM
was constantly modified by the neo-liberal radiator core
constructed around the empty signifier of competitiveness.
Paradoxically enough, the same quality that had enabled the
ESM to become a nodal point capable of representing the social
democratic discourse and even modifying the neo-liberal one,
namely its capacity to resonate with a wide set of interests
(Bradanini, 2009), was also the quality that facilitated its openness
to the influence of contending discourses. Thus, while references
to the ESM steadily increased in official documents of the
Commission (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2015: 11), they were pro-
gressively deployed for justifying market expansion instead of
market correction.
The 2000 Lisbon Strategy, and overarching agenda of socio-
economic reforms for the next decade, deepened in this
Schumpeterian discourse. It was launched with the broad aim
to make Europe, by 2010, “the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world” (European Council,
2000). According to the Lisbon Agenda, this aim was going to be
achieved by “completing the internal market”, “stepping up the
process of structural reform for competitiveness”, “modernizing
the European social model”, “combating social exclusion”,
integrating financial markets, regulations and services and
stimulating technoscientific innovation (ibid.). In the social
policy field, the main reform was the introduction of the Open
Method of Coordination, a new governance instrument aimed at
extending “best practices” in a range of social policy areas
through forms of voluntary coordination.
These sets of social policy measures were not accompanied by
any advance towards the building of European macro-economic
institutional arrangements, as Delors himself has recently
admitted (Delors, 2013: 175). In this dimension, in the 1997
Amsterdam Summit, Jospin only obtained “a face-saving
compromise” (Howarth, 2002: 358) that involved the addition
of the word “growth” to the stability pact, so that no
reformulation of the structure of the EMU was agreed. Although
Jospin’s socialism and its associated European vision were
not especially leftist, and in fact they were known as Réalisme
de Gauche (Clift, 2002), they were nevertheless challenging
the “there is no alternative” neo-liberal discourse. Hence,
European integration remained a form of “negative integration”
(Scharpf, 1999) that did not provide a strong legal basis
for the reconstruction of market-correcting mechanisms at the
European level.
In last instance, this implied that the social investment
discourse articulated by the new social democracy of the 1990s
was undermined by strategic selectivities of the EU. The ambition
of the social investment approach was to combine the contra-
dictory demands of achieving higher levels of employment and at
the same time meet the Maastricht principles, the implications of
which were deflationary. In this sense, a very important obstacle
to the social investment strategy was not only that the social
dimension of the integration process relied on the non-binding
mechanisms of the Open Method of Coordination, but also and
especially that it had to compete with an opposed and stronger
ordoliberal monetary framework. Hence, the pressures to reduce
public investment coming from the design of the Eurozone, as
well as the strongly institutionalised internal market, curtailed
the social investment necessary to promote competitiveness.
The result was a general retrenchment of the European welfare
states and the creation of what Martín (2008) called an “ESM of
low cost”.
Despite this fact, European social democratic parties remained
completely loyal to the EU project. Indeed, the period of social
democratic predominance in Europe coincided with the con-
solidation of the neo-liberal hegemony in the EU: as several
empirical studies have shown, during the first years of the new
century, a finance-driven accumulation strategy stimulated by the
Financial Services Action Plan of the Lisbon Strategy was
developed throughout Europe (Birch and Mykhenko, 2013),
while both the Lisbon agenda and the EES were used in different
countries for justifying tighter forms of labour activation and
flexibility (De la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012). Furthermore, the
emergence of an egalitarian alternative to neo-liberalism became a
remote possibility, and in fact, the intellectual hegemony in
Europe became more liberal than ever. Nevertheless, as the
concluding section explains, this apparent contradictory situation
—the simultaneous wave of electoral successes of social demo-
cratic parties throughout the EU and the parallel deepening of
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neo-liberalism in Europe—can be read from the theory of
hegemony as precisely the best proof of the consolidation of neo-
liberal discourse.
Conclusions: the dangers of the narrow strategic selectivities
of the European integration project
The theoretical framework articulated in this article understands
that policy analysis cannot be reduced to the description of
institutional “data” nor can it take political phenomena as
epiphenomenal expressions of economic or technological devel-
opments. Instead, it assumes that political analysis must seek to
“open” social objectivity and interpret the sum of elements that
are discursively articulated in each historical period. In this
manner, policy analysis becomes the task of uncovering the
meanings and correlations of forces that are condensed in
concrete institutional constructions.
In our case study, the neo-liberal “need to improve competi-
tiveness” became a depoliticised and apolitical normative
imperative that came to guide the construction of the EU to the
extent that it was assumed by those parties claiming to confront
neo-liberalism. A discourse is hegemonic when, although defining
a terrain of struggle that compels its political adversaries to
assume its own values, it is universally accepted as objective
within a society. As Thatcher once proudly declared, the best
legacy of her mandate was Blair’s New Labour. Indeed, this is
what hegemonic struggles are about: not about the competition
for the imposition of certain policy aims, but about the definition
of the rules that govern competition itself. Thus the strategic
selectivities sedimented in the institutional architecture of the EU
favoured that, to electorally defeat neo-liberal forces, the socialist
parties had to look as much as possible like them. As said by one
of the right-wing crafters of the post-Pinochet’s Chilean
constitution, it was “about making a constitution that even when
the adversary rules he does it in much the same way as we would"
(quoted in Errejón, 2014: 8).
This historical development helps to explain why social
democracy has failed to benefit from the crisis that has engulfed
the Eurozone since 2008. One on hand, despite the fact that the
dramatic forms that the global financial crisis took within the EU
uncovered important dysfunctionalities in its ordoliberal design,
the crisis management has privileged a solution (supported by
social democratic parties) based on the strengthening of the
technocratic mode of European integration as well as well as on
the implementation of structural reforms aimed at improving
competitiveness. On the other hand, not surprisingly, social
democratic parties have lost most of the EU governments since
2008. In May 2017, social democracy only governs in 6 of the 28
member states (Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Czech Republic, Slovakia
and Malta—the only state where it governs alone), while in some
other countries, like Netherlands, United Kingdom or Greece, it
has become a residual force. Indeed, from the neo-Gramscian
approach outlined in this article, such a process of margin-
alization can be interpreted as the result of the successful
articulation—around the empty signifier of competitiveness—
between the social democratic and neo-liberal discourses, since
the conditions that enable the emergence of counter-hegemonic
resistance zones are the gaps left inside a hegemonic articulation
(Laclau, 1979). We can therefore see in the very deepness of the
articulation between social democracy and competitiveness both
the condition for the return to power of most European social
democratic parties in the years before the crisis as well as the
cause behind the incapacity of these parties, once the crisis began,
to construct an alternative to the neo-liberal discourse.
Nevertheless, this radical restraining of the range of political
choices available within the European institutional order might
produce destabilizing tendencies for such an order in the medium
term. The technocratic fantasy assumed by the Third Way social
democracy of reducing politics to the mere administrative
management of non-conflicting affairs might as a result leave a
large segment of their popular constituency—probably those
more unable to “compete in the market”—orphan of an
alternative to neo-liberalism10 . In fact, cannot we think in this
post-political closure of the discussion of issues that most affect
social conditions of the subaltern sectors as constituting the main
condition of possibility for the emergence of Eurosceptic populist
forces throughout the EU?
Notes
1 Branded by Escalona and Vieira (2014) as a “Faustian pact”.
2 By 1982 socialist parties were only in power in Greece and in Italy.
3 This strategy was defended by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Ministre d’Etat and leader
of the left-wing faction of the PS (Featherstone, 1988: 128).
4 On the ideological nature of the U-turn, see Bliek and Parguez (2008) and Cameron
(1996).
5 The comparison with Japan and the United States became really pervasive in the
policy documents of the EC during the 1990s. For instance, in the 1993 White Paper
on competitiveness one finds up to 58 times the EU compared to Japan (European
Commission, 1993), while the 2000 European Competitiveness Report permanently
evaluates EU’s economic performance in relation to the United States and Japan
(European Commission, 2000).
6 Article 6.1, SEA.
7 The automaticity of the penalties was a German demand that was excluded from the
final project (Wilsher, 2014: 249)
8 Cycle only countervailed by the incessant accumulation of debt that the soft binding
constraints of the SGP allowed.
9 Article 126, Treaty of the European Union.
10 In this sense, sociological analysis support the idea the increasing detachment of
lower classes constitutes one of the main factors behind the steady electoral decline of
European social democracy (Moschonas, 2009a).
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